

Town Meeting



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What Can We Expect In Korea?

Moderator, JAMES F. MURRAY, JR.

Speakers

COL. BEN C. LIMB

ROBERT AURA SMITH



COMING

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What Can We Expect In Korea?

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THE SPEAKERS' COLUMN

COL. BEN C. LIMB—Ambassador, Representative of Korea to the United Nations. Born in Seoul, Korea in 1893, Col. Limb attended schools in his native city, but completed his education in the United States, where he attended Mt. Hermon preparatory school and Ohio State University. He took part in the organization of the Korean revolt against Japan, when in 1919 he became Secretary of the Korean Commission in America and Europe, the unofficial embassy of the Korean provisional government. He served in the Korean Commission in Washington, D.C. during the 1930's toward the same end.

Col. Limb was Syngman Rhee's aide when Dr. Rhee was elected President of the Korean Republic in exile in Shanghai. For the next thirty years he served as private secretary to President Rhee until his appointment as Foreign Minister in 1949.

He attended the organizational sessions of the United Nations at San Francisco, and in 1947 attended the General Assembly meetings at Lake Success as Korean representative. Three years later, he was made chief of the Korean Mission to the U.N.

Since the war in Korea, Col. Limb has had many significant conferences on policy with the President and other high officials of the United States, as well as with top representatives to the United Nations.

ROBERT AURA SMITH—Editorial writer, *The New York Times*; Expert on the Far East. Born in Denver, Colorado, 1899, Robert Aura Smith was graduated from Ohio Wesleyan University and, as a Rhodes scholar, received his master's degree from Oxford University.

He returned to the United States to be associate professor of English at Drake University from 1920 to 1921 and later taught at Evansville College from 1924 to 1925.

In 1925, he joined the editorial staff of the Cincinnati *Commercial Tribune* and during the next few years was also a correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*. He left for Manila in 1930 to become news editor of the *Manila Daily Bulletin* and a staff correspondent for the *New York Times*. In 1937 he switched to the *Times* cable desk, and since 1945 has been associated with the paper's foreign news department.

During World War II, Mr. Smith worked with the OWI in India and New York. He returned to teaching in 1945 as a lecturer at Yale University and from 1946 to 1947 at Barnard College.

He is now widely known as a lecturer on the Far East as well as the author of *Our Future in Asia*, 1940; *Your Foreign Policy*, 1941; and *Divided India*, 1947.

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What Can We Expect In Korea?

Announcer:

Tonight, America's Town Meeting originates from the auditorium of the Corning Glass Center in Corning, New York, where the program is presented in co-operation with the Junior Chamber of Commerce. The Corning Glass Center was opened in 1951, marking the 100th anniversary of the Glass Works, and this summer was host to its one-millionth visitor. The ultramodern building houses a fascinating Museum of Glass, a Hall of Science and Industry, a valuable Research Library covering the history of glass, and the Steuben factory, where visitors can watch beautiful glass being made.

The Corning Glass Works is joined by the local Junior Chamber of Commerce in serving as host to Town Meeting. We salute the Corning Jaycees who have become the leading public service group in the community.

And now to preside as moderator for tonight's discussion, here is the noted New York attorney and international counsel, James F. Murray, Jr.

Moderator Murray:

Ladies and gentlemen, I wish that all of you listening to Town Meeting of the Air could be with us tonight in this magnificent Corning Glass Center. You would be thrilled, as we have been, with a tour of the Museum of Glass, the Hall of Science and Industry, and the Steuben Factory. Town Meeting is happy to have this renewed association with such a famous American industry and the Corning Junior Chamber of Commerce. The Glass Center Auditorium has become an outstanding

cultural and educational center in the Corning area, and it provides a very fine setting for our discussion tonight.

Two weeks from tonight, exactly six months shall have passed since the signing of a military armistice in Korea. For Americans, these have been months of tension and exasperation. Revelations of communist duplicity, exposure of their savage treatment of prisoners, mounting suspicion that the manifest insincerity of Red conference table tactics may serve to disguise the vast military build-up in violation of the truce—these and many other factors have combined to provoke bitter reactions of resentment and frustration.

Moreover, although the allies are agreed to achieve dignified independence for a secure and united Korean people, the struggle of reconcile methods with objectives in varying climates of opinion has sorely tested our unity and resolve. As the communists pursue their program of delay and recuperation, several crucial questions now arise to vex the government and the people of our nation. Can the present indecisive deadlock prevail indefinitely? Is time working with us or against us at Panmunjom? Is it more perilous for us to withdraw or to remain in Korea?

What will happen to the anti-communist prisoners when the explanation deadline expires, and finally what must we do if President Syngman Rhee becomes persuaded that another Munich faces his nation, and if he seeks to destroy this threat by unilateral military action? In the critical days ahead, what can we expect in Korea? To explore this vital question tonight, Town Meeting of the

Air is fortunate in having on its panel two of the world's leading authorities on the kindred problems of Korea and the Far East.

Our first guest is Colonel Ben C. Limb, Ambassador and Representative of the Korean Government to the United Nations. Born in Seoul, Korea, Colonel Limb completed his education in the United States, attending Mt. Hermon Preparatory School and Ohio State University. He took part in the organization of the Korean revolt against Japan in 1919, becoming Secretary to the Korean Commission in America and Europe. Colonel Limb subsequently became Syngman Rhee's aide when Dr. Rhee was elected President of the Korean Republic in exile in Shanghai.

For the next thirty years he served as private secretary to President Rhee, until his appointment as Foreign Minister in 1949. He attended the organizational sessions of the United Nations in San Francisco and, in 1947, attended the General Assembly Meetings at Lake Success as the Korean Representative. Three years later, he was made Chief of the Korean Mission to the United Nations. Town Meeting is privileged to welcome again Ambassador Limb.

Col. Limb:

Good evening. As we turn to a discussion of what we can expect in Korea, I know that many of you have a very personal interest in the question. During the eight years since the defeat of Japan, more than a million and a half American men (and some American women) have served in Korea, either in the post-war army of occupation, from 1945 to 1948, or during the three years of hard war. Naturally, they and their families are deeply concerned as

to what has been accomplished and whether it has been worth while.

I want to remind you, ladies and gentlemen, that we thirty million Korean people are even more deeply concerned—because it is our very lives that are at stake. Yet strange and bewildering as it appears, we have had relatively little to do with determining the course of affairs. For instance, the thirty-eighth parallel division of Korea was made without our consent and without our being consulted. When the communist attack was launched against us, we were unprepared militarily because our allies had insisted that we remain unarmed—it being their opinion that that would be a way of maintaining peace on our peninsula.

When truce terms were proposed, we insisted that it would be a mistake to compromise with aggression, and that there could be no real solution until the Chinese Red Army had been driven back across the Yalu River, out of the Korean territory. Well, you know the truce was signed anyway. Now the question is, what will come out of it all? One thing is already clear and that is that the truce is not being observed. The enemy started to break the truce even before the ink was dry on the signatures. You will recall that the truce documents had to be signed separately at Seoul and at Pyongyang, because the communists claimed that they won the war and haughtily refused to come to Panmunjom.

In any event, the communists have built military airfields in Northern Korea within 35 miles of Seoul, the capital city of Korea, though they solemnly promised not to do so. They have brought ships and other military aircraft

into Northern Korea and they have reinforced their military position there—all in flat and direct contradiction to the truce terms.

You have an old American saying (I believe it comes from a famous speech by Patrick Henry) that there is no way of judging the future but by the past. Well, using this yardstick, I don't see how we can expect anything but trouble in Korea as long as all the issues are left unsettled, and the enemy, which the United Nations condemned as an aggressor, is still left entrenched in my country. The enemy promised to join us in trying to talk the problems to a solution beginning not later than October 28, 1953. Well, this is November 24, 1953, almost a month after that date, and the political conference is still remote.

I believe that the conference will be held all right (for basically the communists love international conferences which they use to confuse the free world), but I don't see how any sensible person can expect it to solve the Korean problems. What then will happen? Shall we be content to leave the enemy in Northern Korea? Shall we leave Korea divided? Shall we leave the UN force, largely American, guarding the battle line indefinitely? Shall we keep our people distraught and our economy ruined by leaving Northern Korea, with its rich industrial, mineral and hydro-electric resources, in enemy hands? Are we never going to solve the problem? Of course, I think the problem will not be left unsolved indefinitely.

In the Far East, in the Near East, in Europe, and in many other areas, the tensions are too severe and are too critical to continue indefinitely. Appease-

ment has been tried, ladies and gentlemen, and it has not worked. Stalemate is no solution at all, but merely a postponement of the inevitable. What the people and the Government of the Republic of Korea believe is that the only solution that can possibly work is a victory. The Chinese Reds poured into Korea as aggressors. There cannot be any peace before they are driven out.

In my judgment, ladies and gentlemen, any one who believes otherwise is just whistling in the dark, fooling himself or trying to fool the public. Maybe someone else here has another solution in mind. Maybe there is some easy and painless way out of the dilemma. I have never heard one and have never been able to devise one. But if our panel has another solution to offer, the entire Korean nation will be eager to discover what it is. (*Applause*)

Mr. Murray:

Thank you very much, Ambassador Ben C. Limb. And now our second distinguished guest this evening, Robert Aura Smith, editorial writer of the *New York Times* and expert on the Far East. Mr. Smith was graduated from Ohio Wesleyan University and, as a Rhodes scholar, received his master's degree from Oxford. He returned to the United States to become associate professor of English at Drake University and later taught at Evansville College.

In 1923, he joined the editorial staff of the Cincinnati *Commercial Tribune* and subsequently served as correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*, news editor of The Manila *Daily Bulletin* and staff correspondent for the *New York Times*. Since 1945, he has been associated with the paper's foreign news department. It is a

great pleasure to welcome back to Town Meeting of the Air Robert Aura Smith.

Mr. Smith:

Ladies and gentlemen, may I say at the outset that I consider it an honor as well as a pleasure to be on the same forum with my very dear friend, Colonel Ben Limb. Not only because of our friendship, may I suggest right at the beginning, that you need not expect a squabble or a cock fight or disputation between us. More than that, we are concerned with a problem too grave to be given over to petty friction. We are concerned here, as Colonel Limb has said, with a problem of life and death. We are concerned with the life and death of the Korean state and of its people. We are concerned with the life and death of our own soldiers. We are concerned with the life and death of some of our ideals, some of our aspirations.

In such a consideration, certainly, we have to find the broadest base of judgment that we can get. Colonel Limb says he hopes that someone will bring forward a painless solution of this problem and it will be gladly accepted. I am going to make my suggestions toward that end tonight. All that I can say is that what we can expect in Korea is more of the same or worse. Colonel Limb said that a stalemate was unacceptable. Well, unfortunately through what Pandit Nehru once called the hard logic of circumstances, we are in a position where we are obliged to accept a stalemate, and where we may have to accept it for the better part of the rest of our lifetimes.

The situation into which we have been trapped is such that we are unwilling to break the stalemate,

and unfortunately aren't able to withdraw from it. That puts us in a position of being obliged to continue, as we are now, opposed to an enemy with the presumption of a possible compromise, when we are convinced that that compromise is not going to be forthcoming. I do not believe that very many persons, Mr. Murray, have any confidence that there will ever be a political conference on Korea, and that if there is a conference that it will reach any satisfactory terms whatsoever. Now we are agreed that our objective is unification, freedom, and democracy for Korea, and those are noble objectives.

We have no assurance whatsoever, we have no ground for the assumption, that the communists will tolerate for a moment a united Korea that is either free or democratic or both. Consequently, we are faced with a wall of opposition through which we cannot break except by superior force, and I am convinced, sir, that the people of the United States are not willing to reintervene in Korea by force of their own initiative, having brought bloodshed to an end. Moreover, I believe that the majority of the United Nations would not sustain such a reintervention. Under those conditions, the stalemate is imposed. (*Applause*)

Mr. Murray: Thank you very much, Mr. Smith. I certainly feel, ladies and gentlemen, that Ambassador Limb and Mr. Smith have driven right to the heart of today's problem on Korea. That is the question of stalemate. A stalemate manifests itself in various aspects in this Korean dilemma. I wonder, Mr. Smith and Colonel Limb, if you would care to comment on one particular phase of

this annoying and irritating stalemate, which may come to a head in the middle of January? And I refer, of course, to the problem which will arise when the explanation period for the anti-communist prisoners of war expires on January 22. What do you, Ambassador Limb, think will happen at that time?

Col. Limb: Well, as far as Korea is concerned, we are determined to free the remaining prisoners of war that have chosen to stand with the free world and democracy. They have opposed the communist principles and they have become our allies, and there is no reason to further detain them in our stockade prison houses. They deserve their freedom, as free men, as free citizens of our country. In the first place, they should have been freed three years ago, as we promised them when we gave them billets to come to our side. They have been unreasonably detained for three years, and it is about time that we did the right thing.

Mr. Murray: Do you agree with that, Mr. Smith?

Mr. Smith: Not only do I agree with it, Mr. Murray, I believe that that will be the very strong official position of the United States, that the actual terms of reference of the armistice agreement give us no alternative except to return those prisoners to civilian status 120 days after the signing of the armistice. That representation has already been made by our State Department to the one most important person who disagrees with Prime Minister Nehru.

Mr. Murray: On that very point, Mr. Smith, I am sure you will recall a few days ago a statement attributed to Prime Minister

Nehru, which appeared to indicate that rather than withdraw the Indian custody troops, he might wish to refer the problem of withdrawal back to the United Nations. Now what do you think the position of the United States might be in the event that these troops of India refuse to withdraw from their guard around the stockade unless ordered to do so by the United Nations?

Mr. Smith: I don't think that contingency is going to arise. I am very confident; I have a good deal of confidence in General Thimayya, the head of the Indian command there; he is a very able and sensible officer. But in any case, I am quite sure that if there were a refusal of the Indians to withdraw, the first thing you would get would be a mass breakout of 24,000 prisoners.

Mr. Murray: And you feel the Indians would resist that breakout?

Mr. Smith: I do not. I don't think they would raise a hand against it.

Mr. Murray: The second aspect of the stalemate, which I am sure is uppermost in the minds of many of our people, has been already alluded to in your opening statements, gentlemen, and that is the question of the political conference and its sterile results so far. Now what do you feel is the choice before us in terms of victory, as Ambassador Limb put it, and the necessity, as you put it, Mr. Smith, of putting up with this stalemate for a relatively indefinite period of time? Is there no other way out of this dilemma? Mr. Smith, would you care to comment?

Mr. Smith: No, I don't see a way out of it. That is the reason

that I pose this very unfortunate and very unhappy situation, and it's peculiarly unfortunate because it does not accord in the slightest with our temperament. We are as a nation an impatient people. Long suffering is not one of our national virtues. We want to get things settled and settled quickly, and yet we are faced with a situation in which we cannot have a quick settlement, and will not embrace the means of a quick settlement, because of other considerations. Therefore, we have no alternative but to be resolved, over a long period of time, to endure. It is not a pleasant prospect.

Mr. Murray: Colonel Limb, on that very point you know full well, as do we all, the statement of Dr. Rhee at the time of the armistice signing, wherein he implied that were there no final decision of the political conference at the end of 120 days he would feel free to act unilaterally. Well, as you mentioned at the outset, that conference hasn't even been called. What do you think Dr. Rhee will do at the end of that period, which I believe falls sometime in January?

Col. Limb: Well, that question calls for two answers: First of all, I don't know; and if I knew I wouldn't tell you in public. Now on the whole about this stalemate, I think that the stalemate, if the Americans couldn't stand it, neither can the Koreans; the Koreans are the ones who are shouldering the main burden of it. So the definite means should be found to break that stalemate, and I think that if we search our own hearts and work according to dictates of justice as we learned from God from our babyhood, I think we can get at it very directly.

As your own generals—MacArthur, Van Fleet and Mark Clark and all the other generals—have said, we allies have the means. It is only the politicians who are holding it up. The politicians have not the problems of Asia in mind but they have the problems of Europe in mind. That is why they are making this a stalemate, and I think it is important, therefore the necessity of divorcing the European interest entirely from the interest of Asia. Since the United States is concerned both with European affairs and Asian affairs the United States should be free to deal separately at each time with each problem. (*Applause*)

Mr. Murray: Mr. Smith, do you wish to comment on that?

Mr. Smith: I think, Colonel Limb when we are faced with a political problem, we have a broader problem than this matter of Europe and Asia, because we also have the problem of opinion and judgment within the United Nations. Now it is quite true that some of our operations in Korea were hampered by political differences within the United States, but very definitely since 1951 our operations in Korea have been much more hampered by differences of opinion within the United Nations. Consequently, we have been faced with the difficult political problem of getting some basis of general action among sixty nations.

Mr. Murray: Mr. Smith, what do you feel the United States should do if Dr. Rhee were to act unilaterally next January?

Mr. Smith: Oh, I don't know Mr. Murray. I mean, what can you say? If Dr. Rhee acts unilaterally, he has condemned his own country to death unless we rescue him. If we don't rescue him

we have condemned our own troops in Korea to death. We are dependent on him; he is dependent on us. We have to have the logistical support of the Koreans, just as they have to have our support; we are all in this thing together. We are in it up to our necks, and that is why there is an anxiety about unilateral action. I am hoping that somehow we can get to a point of view and a frame of mind, where in dealing with our Korean allies and brothers, that there will be no such possibility as unilateral action.

Mr. Murray: Gentlemen, as you know, each week Town Meeting presents a complete up-to-date reference library, a twenty-volume set of the American People's Encyclopedia to the listener who submits the most interesting and thought-provoking question pertinent to the subject under discussion. Tonight's question comes from William L. Hagen, Southold, Long Island, New York, and here is Mr. Hagen's question: "What are the major factors in the Korean situation that make an ultimate peaceful settlement so difficult to achieve?" Perhaps, Mr. Smith, you would care to answer first.

Mr. Smith: What are major factors that make a settlement difficult to achieve? I think there is only one major factor that makes a settlement virtually impossible to achieve, and that is an international communist conspiracy for world domination, of which the action in Korea is only one small part. We

face no obstacle except that. (*Applause*)

Mr. Murray: Ambassador Limb?

Col. Limb: I heartily agree with the statement of Mr. Smith, and I also want to compliment Mr. Smith on the phrase he used in his last statement, the unilateral action. That is of first degree importance in the relations between our two countries. As I stated in my opening statement, we have been too often left out in consideration while the problem was directly dealing with our own very lives, in our own country. So, if we are partners, since we have made this mutual defense pact between our two countries, if both of us make up our minds not to take any unilateral action from each other, and always consult and take into confidence the other party, I am sure that our problem will be solved with greater ease and more satisfaction.

Mr. Murray: Mr. Smith?

Mr. Smith: May I add to that, that I think that one of our difficulties is the promotion in the Korean problem of very minor differences and minor difficulties into major problems. I have never been so much shocked in my life as at the fact that during the discussion of the release of the Korean unwilling prisoners by the South Korean government, you could have actually thought from newspapers in the United States, from comment from abroad, that we were fighting Syngman Rhee, and not the communists. In my opinion, that is shocking!

QUESTIONS, PLEASE!

Mr. Murray: We have reached the point where our studio audience will direct questions to our two distinguished guests this evening. On my right, I see a gentleman with his hand raised. Would you tell us, sir, for whom your question is intended?

Questioner: I would like to ask Mr. Limb a question. What is Korea's chief economic need?

Col. Limb: The chief economic need of Korea is to make her economy self-sufficient. During the war, we were obliged to purchase all our needs abroad, especially from our neighboring countries, but now the time has come that we should repair our factories and build new factories to produce the goods we consume, so that we will not send our cash all to foreign countries. Then when we begin to do this, we will build our economy, our economy will proceed from that point on. So we must make our factory goods.

Questioner: Mr. Smith, can we hope for a split between Communist China and the Soviet Union in their foreign policy on Korea?

Mr. Smith: Can we hope for a split between Communist China and Russia? I don't think so. I think that is wishful thinking. I believe that the idea of the Chinese Tito breaking away from the Russians is just another one of those hoaxes like the old agrarian reformers, and that sort of thing. There is no indication that the Chinese Communists wish to split away from the Russians, and no evidence that the Russians would allow them to do so if they did wish to do so.

We now have, as a matter of fact, programs of economic aid to

North Korea in about equal amounts negotiated by both the Soviet Union and the Communist Chinese. They may eventually get into a dog fight. Of course, thieves always run the chance of falling out, but I am not sure that these burglars aren't so tied up in their burglary that they don't dare risk it.

Mr. Murray: Do you have additional comments on this?

Questioner: Yes, I would like to comment on the fact that it seems that we are making a mistake in this country by confusing Communist China with the other satellites within the Soviet orbit. Mao Tze-tung is much too powerful a figure in his own right to just rank in with the other Russian communists, and I personally believe that we have a great hope for a so-called difference to eventually occur between these two major powers. When Malenkov begins to see that Mao is getting too big for his breeches, I think he is going to put his foot down.

Mr. Murray: Gentlemen, do you care to comment on that?

Mr. Smith: Well, I realize Mao Tze-tung may be very large in his own power, and so on, but he hasn't shown himself large enough to declare any independence whatsoever of the Soviet Union. Your own statement, madame, you make Mao Tze-tung a very powerful independent figure, but in his statements he has been nothing but a little whimpering bootlicker running off to brush off the shoes of his Soviet masters. That doesn't look like a powerful figure to me. *(Applause)*

Mr. Murray: Colonel Limb, do you want to comment on that?

Col. Limb: That is very well put, Bob. I want to add the fact that the Chinese Communists are now out on a military venture in the world, and they are determined to succeed in this military venture and they are proceeding with it, and they must get the military means—the guns, and the planes, and the tanks, and artillery. Where do they get them? They do not manufacture—especially the jets and other planes. They all come from Russia, so I think they are tied up to them.

Questioner: Mr. Smith, how much chance do you think there is of unifying North and South Korea without aggression, but through the peace conference?

Mr. Smith: I wish I thought there were more. We have agreed that that is our objective, but I don't see any reason for having very much hope that the communists will agree to it. However, how to do this thing? It is a free election, isn't it? Our idea of how to unify a country is to give everybody a chance to vote just exactly as he pleases. Is there any communist government anywhere in the world that at any time has allowed anyone to vote as he pleased?

Questioner: Mr. Limb, do you think that Russia was the actual cause of the Korean conflict?

Mr. Limb: Of course. The Russians have admitted it very loudly in the United Nations. When Mr. Vishinsky came out this spring and answered your good Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge, to the effect, "yes, we supply the communist armies with the planes, guns, and artillery and ammunition in Korea. Why? Because we have agreements to supply them." That is a good enough reason. Therefore Mr. Vishinsky has an-

nounced to the world that Russia is a partner in this conflict on the enemy's side. There is no question about it.

Mr. Murray: Mr. Smith, do you wish to comment on that?

Mr. Smith: Yes, I would like to add to what Colonel Limb has said, the fact that the North Korean so-called Government, that actually ordered the aggression, was itself never anything but an instrument of the Soviet Union. It is not a government that arose spontaneously out of a country, but a government that has been simply an extension of Russian authority from the beginning.

Questioner: Mr. Smith, do you think that the prestige of the United States was hurt by the limitation of the action of our fighting command in the Korean situation?

Mr. Smith: It is a very hard thing to say whether one's prestige is hurt or not. My own feeling is yes—in Asia, certainly. Prestige goes with strength; prestige goes with victory. And failing to achieve victory, the failure to make use of strength, can hurt prestige. On the other hand, I think that our willingness to try to be reasonable has raised prestige in some quarters; so on balance, I don't know. It is very hard to say. We have limited ourselves, and with some persons apparently the limitation is good. If we had gone right through and won, we would have had one type of prestige; we might have sacrificed another. That's an open sort of question. Don't you think so?

Questioner: That's very true. Thank you.

Questioner: Colonel Limb, do you believe that had General MacArthur been allowed to carry his

mission through, that Korea would now be a united, independent nation?

Col. Limb: Absolutely! I believe. (Applause)

Mr. Murray: That's a very direct answer. Next question, please.

Questioner: Mr. Smith, do you think Korea can expect aid from the Nationalist Chinese forces if future aggression arises?

Mr. Smith: Yes, I do. The Nationalist Chinese have been willing to give assistance in this engagement. But we very definitely refused to permit them because of the fact that we wanted to keep the Korean struggle away from the aspect of the Chinese Civil War. But my experience with the Chinese Nationalists, from Chiang Kai-shek right on down, is that they are perfectly willing to fight Chinese Communists anywhere and any time they can find them. (Applause)

Questioner: Colonel Limb, how do you justify the announced intention of President Rhee to take military action with neither knowledge nor consent of the United Nations?

Col. Limb: Well, I think that is an action of a nation which is independent and free, we have to allow, especially when Korea is prevented from becoming a member of the United Nations itself. I am not now directly taking any action at all whatsoever, not particularly concerning this present war. It is to be presumed that independence signifies that a nation has the right to take any action which will be protecting herself and for the good of herself.

Mr. Murray: Do you have another question from the same quarter? The gentleman on my right.

Questioner: Mr. Smith, do you think that a stalemate is to our advantage, because we are keep-

ing a large Chinese army from fighting elsewhere?

Mr. Smith: There is that aspect to that. Yes, that's true. We are pinning down roughly a million Chinese. But I don't think that that is in itself a justification for a stalemate. And I don't believe that we will have done the right thing unless we make use of the stalemate to keep our forces on a commensurate level. We are not going to increase our forces in Korea itself on the terms of the armistice. We are going to keep them, knowing that our opponents are not going to keep them. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't do quite a good build-up job on Okinawa, for example.

Mr. Murray: We have ten seconds left. Colonel Limb, did you wish to add something?

Col. Limb: Yes, but stalemate, when considering that we have to consider the fate of the Korean people. We don't want to have these million Chinese on our necks all the time; we want to get rid of them. They must be driven out of the Korean territory over the Manchurian border.

Mr. Murray: Thank you very much, gentlemen. I regret sincerely that I must interrupt, but our time has expired. Thank you again for your highly interesting discussion of this very crucial problem. On behalf of Town Hall, our thanks to our hosts here at Corning Glass Works—Mr. Amory Houghton, chairman of the board; William C. Decker, president; James M. Brown, director of the Corning Glass Center, and James V. Mathews; Robert M. Dorwart and Charles Harwood of the Junior Chamber of Commerce; Edwin S. Underhill of the Corning *Evening Leader*; and Gordon Jenkins and George Droelle of Radio Station WCLI.

FOR FURTHER STUDY OF THIS WEEK'S TOPIC

Background Questions

THE POLITICAL CONFERENCE

1. Since the Korean fighting ended indecisively with neither protagonist strong enough to dictate a settlement, must both sides lower their sights in approaching a political conference? Can they possibly win at the conference table what they could not win on the battlefield?
2. What is the likelihood of a political conference settling the political issues surrounding Korea?
3. Is the contention that the Communists do not want a political conference true or false?
4. What could the Communists gain by obstructing a political conference?
 - a. Have they thus far successfully exploited differences between non-Communist nations on Korea and the Far East generally?
 - b. Are they trying to drive a wedge between India and the West?
 - c. Could they be trying to tempt Pres. Rhee into precipitate action, thereby embarrassing the U.S. and U.N.?
5. Is it possible that the Communists want a conference, but are holding out for a conference on the best possible terms that they can obtain?
6. Has the United States valid reasons for fearing such a political conference?
 - a. Have we a sufficiently well-defined Far East policy to facilitate effective participation in such a conference?
 - b. Does the dual problem of protecting U. S. interests, and the same time maintaining the Western alliance make such a conference hazardous for us as well?
7. Is the only question dividing the Western nations that of neutral participation? Or, are there other issues which would prevent our maintaining a united front in our dealings with the Communists on Asian problems?
8. Evaluate the progress of the preliminary conference at Panmunjom.
 - a. Is the composition of the conference the only outstanding problem?
 - b. Is there a middle ground between the Communist demand for participation of Asian neutrals and the insistence that only belligerents take part?
 - c. Evaluate the U. S. conditions for eventual neutral participation—e.g.
all parties to the conference, including South Korea, would have to agree.

the conference would start out as a two-sided affair.

neutrals would not be invited until substantial progress on a Korean settlement had been made.

- d. Evaluate the Communist proposal that neutrals be admitted from the beginning as advisers and observers.
 - e. Evaluate the proposal to ask India and perhaps others on the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission to attend the Korean peace conference to answer questions about prisoners of war.
9. What are U. S. and U. N. objectives at the proposed Korean peace conference?
 - a. Should they press for the withdrawal of all foreign troops?
 - b. Will they propose free elections as an essential condition of any settlement?
 - c. Should the U. S. and U. N. hold out for a unified, neutralized Korea?
 - d. Evaluate suggestions that they urge the creation of a buffer zone near the Chinese borders.
 - e. What type of international security guarantees should they demand?
 10. What is the likelihood of the Communists accepting any or all of the above proposals?
 11. It was recently stated by a South Korean official that "a neutralized Korea will be incompatible and even in contradiction to the Korea-U. S. Mutual Security Pact which was recently signed." Do you agree?
 12. Is neutralization of Korea a feasible project?
 13. What are the prospects for an indefinite stalemate along present lines?

THE PRISONERS OF WAR

1. Is the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in reality neutral? Or, is this a convenient fiction?
2. If these nations can be classed as neutrals in the Korean conflict, or at least as non-belligerents, are Poland and Czechoslovakia neutrals of the same order as Sweden, Switzerland and India?
3. Was compulsory attendance at explanation sessions a necessary requirement in order to be fair to both sides?
4. Are charges that compulsory attendance is cruel, unjust and inhuman correct?
5. Has the opposition of most POW's to return to China and North Korea constituted a serious ideological defeat for the Communists?
6. Prime Minister Nehru recently stated that non-repatriated prisoners

in Korea should not automatically revert to civilian status on January 22, if the political conference has not taken place. Do you agree?

7. Secretary Dulles stated on November 17th, "The armistice provisions are clear, all prisoners who have not chosen repatriation, and as to whom no other disposition has been agreed to by the political conference shall be given their freedom after 120 days. This period ends January 22, 1954." Do you agree?
8. What will happen to prisoners given their civilian status? Where will they go?

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

1. What should the U. S. be prepared to do if the Korean talks break down?
2. If Pres. Rhee orders his army to move against North Korea, what should U. S. policy be?
 - a. Are we morally obliged to help him? Can we afford to pull out of Korea in any case?
 - b. As a U. N. member, are we obliged to oppose any such action as aggression?
3. Is a Communist attack an immediate danger? Have they utilized the truce to build up their military forces in North Korea? Have they violated the truce agreement?
4. In the event of a renewed war, should the U. S. take the responsibility of extending the conflict to Manchuria? the rest of China?



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